Dr Brian J Phillips
@brian_jphillips
“Ultimately terrorist designation and civil war dynamics interact in significant but under-researched ways”
Dozens of states now formally label certain rebel groups as “terrorists,” and this seems to be shaping civil war in fundamental ways. When governments added the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to their terrorist lists in the late 1990s and early 2000s – criminalising material support to it – the classification imposed substantial financial pressure on the group, which had depended on diaspora support. The once-strong Tigers increasingly turned to crime for funding and were militarily defeated by 2009.
While a growing literature examines terrorist designation and the related concept of proscription, this often exists within terrorism studies, separate from civil conflict studies. In this blog I argue that scholarship on civil war can deepen its understanding of conflict processes – especially paths out of civil war – by incorporating more analyses of terrorist designation.
How terrorist designation affects civil war
Terrorist designation has important implications for civil war. First, terrorist labelling can severely complicate peace processes, as in the case of Colombia where Sophie Haspeslagh argues that terrorist designation slowed down peace talks. When rebel groups are legally declared “terrorists,” this can prohibit third parties like mediators from working with them. Participation in peace processes is already costly, as Victor Barrera has previously argued on the Civil War Paths blog. A “terrorist” label can also make it more complicated for governments to justify negotiations to their citizens, delaying peace. If a war doesn’t end through negotiations, violence and destruction could continue for years.
There are also implications for economic development. Countries facing civil conflict already confront challenges like displacement and destroyed infrastructure. Terrorist designation can add to these issues by producing a chilling effect on foreign aid. Evidence suggests that aid agencies might be afraid to be accused of providing “material support” to a terrorist group, and potential charity donors might fear similar accusations.
In Yemen aid agencies and NGOs have opposed terrorist labelling of the Houthi movement because the group controls a great deal of populated territory, and providing much-needed aid to Yemeni people requires working with the Houthis – which could become a crime through terrorist designation.
Finally, terrorist designation also matters for civil war processes because of its intended effects: weakening targeted groups and reducing their use of violence. However, research suggests that the effects of designation are neither straightforward nor guaranteed. Many designated groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, do not seem significantly affected by the policy. However, in other contexts, the use of terrorist designation seems to be potent. For example, designation seems to reduce the use of violence among groups that depend on donations (like the Tamil Tigers), are young, or operate in countries that are allies of the designating country. Much therefore remains to be learned about how and when terrorist designation produces its intended effects.
Given these diverse findings, how can civil war studies build on, and inform, research on terrorist designation?
How civil war studies can incorporate terrorist designation
Terrorist designation could fruitfully be considered by scholars looking at outcomes like civil war intensity, civil war duration, rebel governance, and rebel funding. Studies of these outcomes have looked at other factors such as leadership targeting to explain civil war phenomena but have not typically considered terrorist designation as a possible contributing or explanatory factor in examining paths into, and out of, civil wars.
Civil war scholars could additionally consider terrorist designation when studying rebel group formation and fragmentation. Sometimes terrorist designation causes groups to fragment or re-name themselves, since membership in, and donations to, the group named in the designation have been criminalised. This happened in Pakistan, for example, when Jaish-e-Mohammad fragmented and renamed itself Khuddam-ul-Islam after being proscribed in 2002.
Finally, as highlighted above, terrorist designation produces uneven effects on armed groups. Thus greater case study research on rebel groups who have been listed as terrorist organisations is needed to understand the (un)intended effects of terrorist designation and its relationship to the broader war environment.
How terrorism studies can benefit from considering the civil war context
Civil war research can also inform terrorism studies in important ways. Gaps remain in terrorism studies around understanding the conditions surrounding terrorist designation, for which recourse to civil war processes may contribute explanatory potential. The Taliban, for example, was never designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” by the United States at least in part to make potential war-ending negotiations easier.
Additionally, civil war research can meaningfully expand the scope of terrorism studies outcomes, which predominantly focus on phenomena like violence levels. Given that terrorist-designated groups are frequently rebel organisations, research on terrorist designation could study additional outcomes more frequently attended to in civil war research, including civil war longevity and peace processes.
Ultimately, terrorist designation and civil war dynamics interact in significant but under-researched ways, requiring more discussion between these fields of research.
