This is a summary of an article exploring coalition formation and mobilisation across sectarian differences in Lebanon. It is published in Ethnopolitics; the original publication can be read here.
This paper focuses on the mobilisations of ordinary Lebanese who came together across their differences in the small demonstrations leading to the massive demonstrations of March 8 and March 14, 2005, which I argue was the starting point of transforming what could have become a critical juncture into a missed opportunity. While new cross-sectarian imaginaries emerged temporarily in the midst of the events and did not take hold as such, and the institutionalised change did not materialise in the overthrow of the ‘sectarian system,’ this period changed the subsequent political landscape by modifying the composition of political alliances, which were no longer structured primarily on a sect-based basis and instead took on a cross-sectarian characteristic. It is therefore critical to analyse the workings of sect identities differently from existing studies to understand the subtler ways in which sect identities were reframed despite the inability to altogether ‘break from past communal politics’ or change ‘the communal and sectarian nature of the political system’ (Clark & Zahar, 2015, p. 2). To understand the dynamics of the ‘near miss critical juncture,’ I focus on the manifestations of sect identities at the popular level during the unfolding of the critical juncture in the aftermath of Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination.
Sect Habitus as Analytical Tool to Study ‘Sectarianism’
Building on Bourdieu (1977), I define sect habitus as the set of dispositions and characteristics that organise practices, representations, and, more generally, the common sense of a social group based on one’s religious identity (Rouhana, 2021). These sect-based dispositions and characteristics operate at both the conscious and non-conscious levels. Social groups (in this case, religious sects) come to embody these dispositions and tendencies, and because of their seemingly ingrained nature, members of groups experience them as if they are innate. Members of a specific sect are inclined towards certain economic, political, social, and cultural behaviours that operate in relation to social settings or fields, in Bourdieu’s parlance. Each field has its own set of rules, regularities, and structures. Once operating in a field, a member tends to use a set of practices that are supposed to work for those occupying that position within the field. More importantly, the concept of habitus understands people’s actions as the product of the history of their relationships with each other and their own history rather than being ‘an instantaneous reaction to immediate stimuli’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 124). Finally, habitus is ‘an open system of the dispositions that are constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. It is durable but not eternal!’ Habitus escapes structural determinism by allowing some agency which gives it the seeming durability on the one hand and change on the other (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Daily practices and experiences either reinforce or modify the sect-based structures and sect identities by means of subjecting the set of sect-based dispositions to these daily practices.
The New Sect-based Imaginations
During the first three weeks following the February 14th assassination of PM Hariri, people came together in small mobilisations to protest the Syrian Army occupation, implying the Lebanese people’s belief in the Syrian government’s involvement with Hariri’s killing. Groups started gathering in Martyrs’ Square in downtown Beirut. According to Young (2010), ‘In the month after February 14, it was the public that led the way’ (p. 29). This public was unique: ‘You could see Arabists alongside Lebanese nationalists; dissident communists alongside Christian federalists; religious conservatives alongside hedonistic atheists’ (p. 23). Most importantly, people from different sects came together in one place for the same reason for the first time since the end of the civil war. This unprecedented scale of coming together of various sects in Martyrs Square enabled the embodiment of non-divisive sect-based imaginations. That means, sect-based differences were not eliminated amid these demonstrations; indeed, they continued to be meaningfully lived and enacted, but in ways that defy those who understand sect identity as always and only conflictual and contentious.
People started bringing to the square religious symbols that had once held sectarian meanings, but at this moment, they did something different with those symbols: rather than pitting them against one another, they held them in proximity to each other as a way to express a longing for a shift in sect habitus. It is not usual for members of the Lebanese Forces (LF)—a right-wing Christian militia that was formed during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990)—wearing the war militia outfits in 2005 to hold a sign displaying the Christian cross and the Muslim crescent with the slogan ‘Together Free Lebanon.’ Also, it is unusual to see photographs of a Sunni leader (Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) covered with Muslim and Christian symbols at the same time. It is not a minor act for a PSP member to hold the cross in one hand and the Quran in the other. It is also not a minor act for PM Hariri’s photo to be covered with rosaries alongside Islamic prayer beads.The rosary in Lebanese Christian traditions is used in this way on photos of saints or on photos of a deceased member of the family; here, the rosary was used to commemorate a deceased Sunni Muslim—a remarkable act.
The rosaries on the photo of a Sunni leader and countless similar actions amid the demonstrations exceeded coexistence; they not only merged different and often opposing sect identities and practices, but they also fused the differences of religious and sect cultures into new sect-based imaginations that manifested in non-divisive sect-based practices. These symbolic acts were generated by the new sect’s imaginations that burst forth and were emblematic of these three weeks. Hence, these new sect imaginations emerged out of old sectarian practices, but during this period, people gave them new non-divisive meanings.
Closing Down of the New Sect Imaginations
In response to the increasing popular demands and as a retort to the overwhelming foreign pressure exercised on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, the Hezbollah, Amal, Marada, the Syrian Social Nationalist, and the Lebanese Democratic parties called for a peaceful demonstration on March 8th where hundreds of thousands gathered to thank Syria for their help with ending the 1990 civil war and their continued support of the resistance against Israel.
The March 8th demonstration was the starting point of reinstating the fear of the ‘Other.’ At that time, sect-based divisions re-emerged, displacing the burgeoning popular cross-sect sect imaginaries that had taken hold in the previous three weeks.
What had been a shifting of the sect habitus now took a different route; the reimagining of the sectarian subject, during the month of mobilisations between February 14th and March 14th, could not overcome the entrenched Lebanese sectarian system. The new sectarian structures that emerged in the wake of this month were to some degree different from what had prevailed in Lebanon for decades, but they also preserved the power relations embedded within the sectarian system. Political leaders and organisers were able to tap into the longstanding sectarian practices and fear of the ‘Other’ to keep their constituencies within the existing sectarian structures and borders.
Conclusion
The paper shows that the period leading to the March 14th demonstration was as important as that day, if not more, in contrast to most analyses of the period, which just regard it as a build-up to March 14th. The four weeks prior exhibited intense changes in the sect habitus at the popular level. This term—sect habitus—gets at the experiences of daily conscious and non-conscious social relations that structure sectarian dispositions and behaviours of different groups in Lebanon. The resulting approach gives people’s actions throughout the four weeks importance and understands them in the context of larger structures at play.