This is a summary of an article conceptualising the interaction between the practices of adaption strategies deployed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) and the Colombian state counterinsurgency efforts from the late 1990s to the 2010s. It is published in the Journal of Peace Research; the original publication can be read here.
How did the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) survive the Colombian state counterinsurgency campaign? This article introduces the concept of counterinsurgency at work as a dynamic that captures the interaction between the practices of the adaptation strategies deployed by the FARC-EP, specifically increased mobility and quarantine, and the Colombian state counterinsurgency efforts from the late 1990s to the 2010s. I argue that the FARC-EP deployed adaptation strategies in response to a modernized Colombian military apparatus by repurposing and incorporating new roles, practices, and rules, which nonetheless had multiple, contradictory effects on this group’s inner workings. Evidence from life histories with former FARC-EP combatants and retired personnel from the Colombian armed forces demonstrates this interplay.
The concept of counterinsurgency at work as a dynamic captures two levels of interaction. The first, between increased mobility and quarantining in response to various strategies deployed simultaneously by the Colombian armed forces. The second level deals with the consequences of both adaptation strategies on the FARC-EP’s inner workings. By capturing these interactions, I move beyond what can be gleaned through a focus on top-down counterinsurgency strategies and the FARC-EP’s official documents regarding adaptation. Instead, I examine the practices of increased mobility and quarantining then-combatants carried out in the everyday. A turn to the day-to-day reveals the complex social realities of adaptation practices to counterinsurgency and its unanticipated effects within armed groups. Hence, it calls for disaggregating armed groups—not treating them as homogenous units of analysis—and challenging the intentionality of both counterinsurgency and adaptability.
Increased mobility and its effects
“Before the El Caguán [failed peace process between 1999 and 2002], we used to stay up to 15 days in a camp, sometimes one or two months. After the El Caguán, with [Álvaro] Uribe [Colombian president from 2002 to 2010], we wouldn’t last more than two days in the same camp,” says a former combatant (LH009). This quotation illustrates the adaptation strategy increased mobility. It involved moving frequently, often daily and in smaller groups. Through increased mobility, the FARC-EP changed their daily routines to survive the “onslaught” or “la arremetida” as the ex-combatants refer to the counterinsurgency campaign (LH001/LH003/LH005/LH006/LH015). Following the El Caguán, the FARC-EP realized it was up against faster and more modernized military forces (LH003/LH005/LH006/LH025). The adoption of increased mobility by the FARC-EP is examined in response to the counterinsurgency strategies imposition of control, armed competition, and local disembedding. The practices of increased mobility had multiple, contradictory effects. While increased mobility created bonding, it undermined this group’s capacity to deploy large-scale military operations and disrupted socialization institutions.
Former combatants show that increased mobility required readiness. Incorporating readiness amidst the military pressure of the Colombian state “strengthened and united us” (LH003/LH006). Ex-combatants highlight the uncertainty of not knowing when or where they would eat or sleep, the need to keep equipment always prepared, and the importance of avoiding traces or making noise that could alert the enemy. Equally important was supporting comrades not to make mistakes that might have compromised the security of dozens of troops or exposed key supporters among the local population (LH003/LH006/LH012/LH020)
Quarantining and its effects
“Being close to the local population brought comfort to many. But that came at a deadly cost. Some accepted gifts from the locals or friends who had flipped. Those were not gifts or good- will but the poison that guided the enemy’s aerial bombardments” (LH015). This quotation from a FARC-EP ex-combatant exemplifies quarantining, an adaptation strategy that involved storing all incoming goods and supplies for extended periods in quarantine camps. In these places, combatants scanned for electronic tracking devices or microchips—“the poison” or el veneno (LH001/LH003/LH006/LH012)—which could be as small as a thumbnail. The FARC-EP adopted quarantining in response to the killing of top and mid-level commanders through high-precision airstrikes in the 2000s and 2010s. These unprecedented attacks led the FARC-EP to believe that the state had tracked their exact locations using microchips. El veneno could be hidden anywhere: in food, radios, GPS devices, laptops, lanterns, toiletries, boots, under-wear, or military hardware. Its sources varied: gifts from relatives, acquaintances, support networks, and goods from trusted suppliers. Planting microchips also required individuals who would bring them into the camps. The Colombian military accomplished this by infiltrating the FARC-EP’s local units, urban networks, and even its member’s relatives. The FARC-EP adopted quarantining in response to the counterinsurgency strategies leadership decapitation and local disembedding. Same as increased mobility, quarantining also had multiple, contradictory effects. It was not only a strategic choice, but also an emergent property amidst the counterinsurgency campaign.
The life histories of former combatants suggest that quarantining saved the lives of on-the-ground-commanders with implications for the unity of the FARC-EP before and during the peace talks with the Colombian government (2012–2016). According to former combatants, had quarantining not been implemented—despite its shortcomings—high-precision strikes would likely have killed more FARC-EP mid-level commanders than they already had in the 2000s and 2010s. Quarantining was essential for the survival of these local cadres, known for their military capabilities and legitimacy among rank-and-file (LH003/LH012/LH015/LH024). However, quarantining had other effects on the inner workings of the FARC-EP. Former combatants refer to the end of an era of plenty and well-being, contrasting their wartime living conditions before and during the counterinsurgency campaign (LH003/LH005/LH015/LH024). These challenging circumstances led to desertions, especially among young combatants who “joined the FARC-EP during the golden years” (LH001).
Quarantining, or lack thereof, also impacted trust among combatants and toward the local population. Discovering microchips and thereby avoiding an air strike fostered trust and bonding (LH009/LH012/LH021/LH024). Similar to increased mobility, it meant that rebels were being disciplined, and no one had flipped. On the contrary, mistrust arose when an aerial attack against the FARC-EP succeeded. “We began to suspect the presence of a mole—un infiltrado—someone who had planted the chip, behaved suspiciously, or perhaps even someone in charge of scanning who had deliberately failed to do their job properly,” tells an ex-combatant (LH001/LH003/LH021/LH027). When counterespionage measures uncovered infiltrators, “they were executed” (LH001/LH006). Amid a widespread context of mistrust, some “executions” also stemmed from bad blood between superiors and rank-and-file, leading some combatants to defect and collaborate with authorities out of fear (LH002/LH003).
Conclusion
Nonstate armed organizations adapt to external pressure. However, adaptation has multiple, contradictory effects on their internal dynamics. By focusing on both levels of interaction, I demonstrate the analytical utility of counterinsurgency at work. This argument implies crucial lessons for studying insurgent adaptability in response to counterinsurgency and how adaptation unintentionally transforms armed groups internally. It also advances scholarship on the organizational turn in civil war studies and organizational adaptation, and contributes to research on the significance of everyday experiences for the study of armed group transformation more generally.