Sadeen Haddad
“…this points to a duality between social welfare provision and ideology dissemination, and evidences how social institutions can go far beyond creating a reliance on armed groups in conflict (and post-conflict) settings.”
The Civil War paths project explores the relational-processual nature of civil wars; an important turn in the literature which has moved us beyond the assumption that actors are static or unimpacted by their relations with other actors. The nature of armed groups’ relations has gained attention in this scholarship – including relations with civilian localities. Armed groups have assumed complex roles within civilian communities, including as governance providers. Armed group members have equally attempted to yield social influence, for example through political speeches and even through their role in religious institutions. In my research I build on these advances to explore the links between social service provision and ideological rhetoric and ask: can armed groups integrate ideology into governance engagements?
This blog explores the nature by which armed groups can attempt to shape public rhetoric and use social institutions to platform their ideology, using the case of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. I draw from archival research collected from UMAM D&R between 1980-1989 to illustrate how Hezbollah enmeshed itself in Shi’a localities during the Lebanese Civil War, and through this was able to use its institutional-social reach to disseminate its ideology, and public framing of threat.
Hezbollah’s founding
As one of the three largest sectarian groups, the Shi’a, have faced historical deprivation and unequal representation in Lebanon. A frequently cited example of this is the continued use of the 1932 census that is highly misrepresentative of current demographics, which has led to underrepresentation of the Shi’a in Lebanon’s confessional system. Within this context, Shi’a mobilisation against deprivation and inequality emerged in the 1960s and 70s, prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Initially under secular-leftist and communist groups, as well as parties affiliated with Palestinian armed actors, Shi’a mobilisation was characterised by secular demands around socioeconomic disparities. Later, Shi’a mobilisation gained momentum under Shi’a-Iranian cleric Musa Al Sadr, who led a wave of mobilisation that was distinctly sect-based, through his organisation Amal. Musa Al Sadr played a monumental role in incorporating the Shi’a identity into political mobilisation. However, the nature of this mobilisation remained highly focused on domestic grievances. This would shift under Hezbollah.
Following its initial formation in 1982 – which culminated in many Shi’a religious actors returning to Lebanon from Iraq after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war – Hezbollah quickly began to establish itself as an institution in the Shi’a community. Its primary focus since inception has been the rejection of Israel, alongside a religious orientation which was explicitly laid out in the 1985 Open Letter. Hezbollah was able to gain substantial support, particularly due to a growing wave of ‘Islamic revolutionaries’ calling for an ‘armed resistance’ in Lebanon, among many other factors. As the militia established a deep-rooted base in the Shi’a community, its institutions gained prominence. These institutions, however, were in no way isolated from Hezbollah’s ideological rhetoric, and played a crucial role in platforming and increasing social engagements with the organisation’s ideology and its public framing of threat.
Institutions and Public Rhetoric: (Re)framing the War
By the time it officially announced itself and its mission in 1985, Hezbollah had already set up numerous social and religious institutions. These included a reconstruction arm (Jihad Al-Binna), a sewing factory, and later an ‘Islamic art exhibition’ that displayed art on the ‘resistance’. Many statements published by Al A’hd, Hezbollah’s primary newspaper at the time, demonstrate the interconnection between sites of art, religion, and social support with Hezbollah’s political-military aims. For example, a statement published in 1987 announcing the launch of a sewing factory by the ‘Martyr Foundation’ framed the importance of this endeavour as interlinked with supporting young women and men to “fight [as] heroines and achieve a kind of self-sufficiency in our Islamic society”. In a similar statement, Jihad Al-Binna emphasises the importance of ‘islamic awakening’ in mobilisation and rebellion. This very briefly demonstrates the intersection between social institutions and rhetoric, whereby these institutions are used as a means to disseminate and platform statements that tie social institutions to ideological ends.
These archival documents reveal the ways in which Hezbollah has stitched its ideology into its social institutions, and through this, has attempted to shape social and political understandings of what these institutions serve. Of course, this rhetoric was not divorced from conflict dynamics, such as the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 which coincided with Hezbollah’s formation. Nonetheless, the ideological framing that Hezbollah was able to advance through its social institutions remains a unique mechanism. This rhetoric tied Hezbollah’s goals to religious ideals, and centred its antithesis to Israel within these goals, diverging from the focus on domestic grievances which had characterised previous strands of Shi’a mobilisation.
Conceptually then, this points to a duality between social welfare provision and ideology dissemination, and evidences how social institutions can go far beyond creating a reliance on armed groups in conflict (and post-conflict) settings. Armed groups can equally use these institutions and their social presence as a vehicle to disseminate ideology, and (potentially) redirect local understandings of what, or who, poses the most imminent threat to that community.
Conclusion
These findings prompt us to consider the roles that armed actors can take in shaping public rhetoric in conflict through social-institutional influence and the legitimating role that social welfare institutions can provide beyond their material benefits. Crucially, my research does not argue that public rhetoric disseminated during and after the war in Lebanon is representative of what was actually believed amongst the Shi’a community. Rather, my work illuminates the process by which an armed group’s ideology can become entrenched in social institutions, and contribute to shaping public discourse on conflict. This highlights the significance of further research on the roles that armed groups play in shaping public perceptions during civil conflict, how this impacts their influence on the overarching trajectory of conflict, and the ways in which this translates into increased mobilisation or adherence to armed group ideals.
